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INTRODUCTION
Recent population data suggests that the United States’
racial and ethnic composition is rapidly changing. Recently,
the Hispanic community eclipsed the African American
community as the most prevalent minority group in the
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United States, comprising an estimated 16.3% of the
population in 2010.1 Additionally, the population of AsianPacific Americans has increased to 4.8% of the total
population. 2 While those numbers indicate a significant
change in the composition of the United States generally, the
population concentrations in specific states reveal more
drastic growth rates. 3 Specifically, ten states including
Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Texas, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, and New York indicate
numbers grossly inconsistent with the national standards.4
The 2010 Census indicated that the Asian-Pacific American
population in California had increased by 31.47% statewide.5
Some cities, such as San Francisco, now have AsianPacific American populations of over 30%.6 Moreover, Latin
Americans comprise more than 37% of the California and
Texas populations, and almost 30% of the Arizona population
according to 2010 census.7 Given these numbers, one would
expect significant minority representation in elected office.
However, most minority groups only win elections by “narrow
margins” and lack true political power.8
Minority groups frustrated by a lack of representation
turn to other remedies to ensure that their votes carry equal
strength, but often find that the current analytical approach
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1. State and County QuickFacts: USA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
2. Id.
3. John O. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New
Demography in a Multiracing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1262 (2001).
4. Id.
5. See Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 1, http://censtats.census.gov/data/CA/04006.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2011) (4,861,007–3,697,513)/3,697,513 = 0.31467 * 100 = 31.467%); 2010 Census
Interactive Population Search, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://2010.census.gov/
2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=06 (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
6. Kathay Feng, Keith Aoki & Bryan Ikegami, Voting Matters: AIPAs,
Latinas/os and Post-2000 Redistricting in California, 81 OR. L. REV. 849, 885
(2002).
7. State and County QuickFacts: California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010);
State and County QuickFacts: Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010); State and County
QuickFacts: Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/04000.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
8. Quyen L. Ta, Comment, Vietnamese Americans, the Voting Rights Act,
and Electoral Power: Challenges to Being Counted, 10 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM.
L.J. 88, 97 (2005).
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9. Id. at 101–02.
10. Angelo N. Ancheta & Kathryn K. Imahara, Multi-Ethnic Voting Rights:
Redefining Vote Dilution in Communities of Color, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 815, 845
(1993).
11. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
12. See Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845–48.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
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adopted by the Supreme Court for section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act (VRA) prohibits redress through its strict size and
dispersion requirements.9 To meet the requirements, several
minority groups have attempted to aggregate for the purposes
of filing a section 2 claim, but courts have expressed
resistance to granting relief without a heightened showing of
group cohesion. 10 Scholars argue that the under-inclusive
nature of the Thornburg v. Gingles11 approach, combined with
the increasingly diverse ethnical composition of the United
States, fails to address true instances of vote dilution and
requires reexamination by the Supreme Court.12
This Comment begins by exploring the history of the
VRA, the current standards applied to minority groups filing
section 2 challenges, and the methods employed by minority
groups to gain protection under the VRA, specifically minority
aggregation. Part I of this Comment discusses the history of
the VRA, beginning with the general reasoning behind the
legislation and the history of its current standards—including
the currently applicable Thornburg v. Gingles analytical
standard—and culminates with a discussion of the diverging
views expressed by the federal circuit courts regarding
minority aggregation. 13 Next, Part II identifies problems
created by the conflicting views of minority aggregation, and
the lack of a clearly defined standard of review for aggregated
section 2 claims.14 Part III discusses the current proposals for
assessing section 2 claims by aggregated minorities, ranging
from imposing a completely new standard, to requiring a
heightened showing of cohesion between both groups. 15
Finally, Part IV suggests an improved standard for the
aggregation of minority groups, taking into account the
diverging perspectives.16

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 174 Side B

04/16/2012 17:10:32

HOPKINS FINAL

626

3/15/2012 8:41:48 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
I.

[Vol. 52

BACKGROUND

A. The Voting Rights Act Generally

04/16/2012 17:10:32

17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
18. The new methods of vote dilution included the use of multi-member
districts and strategies, which over-concentrated a minority into a single
district or dispersed minority groups so widely amongst the majority group in
several districts to limit their political influence. See Feng, Aoki & Ikegami,
supra note 6, at 863–66.
19. Id. at 863.
20. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/vot/intro/intro_b.php (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
22. See Joaquin G. Avila, Eugene Lee & Terry M. Ao, Voting Rights in
California: 1982–2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 131, 137 (2007).
23. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies to any jurisdiction that
maintains “a ‘test or device,’ restricting the opportunity to register and vote”
based on ethnic or language minority status. About Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/
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The protection of voting rights for minority groups in the
United States began with the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment, which states that “[t]he right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.”17 However, as the
legislature began to protect the voting rights of ethnic
minorities, new ways to disenfranchise these groups
evolved.18 The new disenfranchisement methods encouraged
further legislative efforts to increase voting rights
protections, resulting in the 1965 enactment of the VRA.19
Originally, the VRA protections largely centered on the
constitutional guarantees offered by the Fifteenth
Amendment, and consisted of two basic sections.20 Section 2
sought to codify generally the Fifteenth Amendment’s
protection by stating that “[n]o voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner that results in a denial or
abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color.”21 Despite the prohibitions of
section 2, Congress determined that the VRA needed the
additional power of section 5.22 Section 5 applies only to
specific jurisdictions with a high incidence of, or potential for,
minority disenfranchisement.23 Section 5 requires that the
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federal government receive preclearance for any voting
changes in the state from the U.S. Attorney General or the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 24 In its
current form, the VRA prohibits restrictions that prevent
ethnic or language minorities from having an equal
opportunity to elect their chosen representatives. 25 Upon
finding that these protections are a continuing necessity,
Congress passed extensions of the VRA several times over
twenty-five years, most recently in 2006.26
B. The History of Section 2 Vote Dilution Claims
Section 2 applies broadly to all U.S. jurisdictions.27 It
bars states from imposing requirements that negatively
affect a minority’s right to participate equally in the
political process. 28 With such a wide scope, it applies
to most types of minority disenfranchisement based on race,29
allowing minorities to bring claims for vote dilution suits.30
Vote dilution is understood as the “second generation” of U.S.
voting rights law.31 Allowing vote dilution claims ensures
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about.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). If a jurisdiction maintained such a
device, then it became “covered” by section 5, and any “change with respect to
voting in a covered jurisdiction . . . cannot legally be enforced unless and until
the jurisdiction” first receives approval from the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia or the Attorney General. Id.
24. Id.
25. Sebastian Geraci, Comment, The Case Against Allowing Multiracial
Coalitions to File Section 2 Dilution Claims, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389, 391
(1995).
26. Bush
Signs
Voting
Rights
Act
Extension,
MSNBC.COM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14059113/#.TujqDlZ9J90 (last visited Feb. 2,
2012).
27. Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra note 6, at 864.
28. Id.
29. “The Act originally protected only black voters. When it was amended
in 1975 to reach language minorities, the Act then identified four new covered
groups: persons of Spanish heritage; all American Indians; ‘Asian Americans’
including Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Filipino Americans; and Alaskan
natives.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements,
999 F.2d 831, 894 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1973(b)(f)(1) (1988)).
30. See Aylon M. Schulte, Minority Aggregation Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act: Toward Just Representation in Ethnically Diverse
Communities, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 441, 445 (1995).
31. The first-generation of voting rights suits “largely sought to vindicate
classic examples of individual rights” by focusing on “individual citizens casting
individual ballots.” Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an
Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1671 (2001). However, the second-
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that racial minorities have an equal opportunity to elect their
representatives. 32 These claims require a level of racial
polarization, where “white and racial minorities consistently
prefer different candidates.”33
Vote dilution can occur
through two schemes, they are typically known as “cracking”
and “packing.”34
Historically, vote dilution claims developed in response to
the states’ use of at-large voting methods.35 The Supreme
Court sought to solve the problem of vote dilution in at-large
districts through invalidation and replacement with singlemember districts.36 However, through creative redistricting
plans, states still retained the power to dilute the votes of
racial minorities by drawing districts in which white
residents consistently formed a majority. 37 Responding to
these methods required clearer standards for bringing section
2 claims.38
Claims pertaining to vote dilution under the VRA have
been subject to varying proof requirements throughout their
history.39 At the VRA’s inception the courts interpreted its
standards to require proof only of discriminatory effects.40
This general consensus lasted from the VRA’s inception
through 1980.41 However, in Mobile v. Bolden42 the Supreme
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generation challenges include the rights of a racial group. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Feng describes packing as “the overconcentration of minority group
populations into one or two districts for the purpose of minimizing their sphere
of legislative influence” and cracking as dispersing “minorities . . . among
different districts so no one district has enough minorities to influence the
political process.” Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra note 6, at 864.
35. Gerken, supra note 31, at 1672. The first vote dilution suits focused on
individual rights. However, the suits evolved and began to focus on the rights of
an entire racial group. Id. Additionally, “at-large voting methods” refers to
“statewide races” where “more than one representative is elected from a single
district.” Id.
36. Id. at 1673.
37. See id. at 1675.
38. See Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to Communities
Containing Two or More Minority Groups—When is the Whole Greater than the
Sum of the Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 95, 107–08 (1989).
39. Id. at 100–11.
40. See id. at 100.
41. Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra note 6, at 864.
42. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), superseded by statute,
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134, as
recognized in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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C. Analysis of Thornburg v. Gingles
While the Supreme Court and Congress dealt with the
overarching burden of proof, plaintiffs still required guidance

04/16/2012 17:10:32

43. Id. at 61.
44. Strange, supra note 38, at 101.
45. Schulte, supra note 30, at 447.
46. Id.
47. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982), quoted in Ancheta & Imahara,
supra note 10, at 837–38.
48. Schulte, supra note 30, at 448.
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Court held that section 2 “was intended to have an effect no
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.”43 This
holding altered the standard that had been in place for
the first fifteen years of the VRA’s enforcement and imposed a new requirement of discriminatory intent.44 The new
requirement made it nearly impossible to bring claims
under section 2 and ceased voting rights challenges
almost entirely. 45 However in 1982, Congress intervened
and codified the discriminatory effects standard, indicating
that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the standard
of proof did not comply with Congress’ intent.46 The new
discriminatory effects standard required a multi-factor
analysis of the Senate Report Factors, which included: the
extent of the history of official voting discrimination; the
existence of racially polarized voting; election practices that
enhanced the opportunity for discrimination against the
minority group; denial of access to minority groups in the
candidate slating process; the extent to which minority
groups bore the effects of discrimination in such areas as
education and employment, which hindered their ability to
participate in politics; racial campaign appeals; the electoral
success of minorities; whether elected officials significantly
failed to respond to minority groups needs; and whether the
policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of
such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice or procedure was tenuous.47 These factors elucidated
the variety of ways minority voting rights may be diluted,
although Congress clearly asserted that the adoption of this
standard does not grant minorities a right of proportional
representation.48
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49. See Strange, supra note 38, at 106–07.
50. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986).
51. Id. at 50.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 51.
54. Id.
55. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988).
56. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. The term “white voting bloc” refers to the
similarity of the majority’s voting pattern. By demonstrating that the majority
group voted in a cohesive manner, the minority group showed how “a white
multi-member district impeded its ability to elect its chosen representatives.”
Id.
57. Id.
58. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
59. Feng, Aoki & Ikegami, supra note 6, at 866. The court utilized the

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 176 Side B

on the scope of section 2’s protection for vote dilution claims.49
In the landmark case of Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme
Court outlined three requirements for bringing section 2 vote
dilution claims in a multi-member district. 50 First, the
minority group must “demonstrate that it is sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district.”51 The Supreme Court required this
showing to demonstrate that the voting system or voting
practices are responsible for the minority’s inability to elect a
candidate of their choosing.52 Second, “the minority group
must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.”53 The
political cohesion requirement was also directed towards
proving that the multi-member structure consistently
defeats the minority’s interests.54 Additionally, the first two
requirements spoke to the minority’s ability to elect a
single candidate of its choosing.55 Third, the Supreme Court
required that the minority group show that “the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the
absence of special circumstances, . . . to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.”56 Essentially, requiring minorities to
prove that their inclusion in a “white multimember district”
diminished their ability to select their representatives.57
The Supreme Court added to these requirements in
Johnson v. De Grandy,58 by holding that if a plaintiff meets
all three requirements, then the court must determine
whether “under the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ the
minority group has less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the electoral process and to
elect representatives of their choice.”59 The Supreme Court
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later applied this analytical approach to single-member
districts in Growe v. Emison. 60 As a direct result of the
Supreme Court’s enumeration of these factors, the vote
dilution cases became the work of various experts.61 Plaintiffs
required a certain amount of qualitative data to satisfy the
burden of proof imposed solely by the first three factors.62
However, the imposition of the clear elemental approach only
led to more questions about section 2 claims.63
D. Minority Aggregation

1. Express Acceptance of the Right to Aggregate
The Fifth Circuit has emerged as the leader of the first
group by expressly allowing minority aggregation in several

04/16/2012 17:10:32

Senate Report Factors to complete the totality of the circumstances analysis. Id.
at 866 n.67.
60. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993).
61. Gerken, supra note 31, at 1674.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1675.
64. Strange, supra note 38, at 115.
65. Schulte, supra note 30, at 442.
66. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–42 (1993).
67. See Schulte, supra note 30, at 454.
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After the Supreme Court’s enumeration of the Gingles
factors for section 2 dilution claims, some minorities felt
compelled to aggregate in order to meet the Gingles
requirements. 64 Despite the amount of Congressional and
Supreme Court involvement with the VRA, both bodies
remained silent on the aggregation of minorities for the
purposes of bringing a section 2 claim.65 However, in Emison,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that while it would not
directly decide whether aggregated minorities could bring
section 2 vote dilution claims, if an aggregated minority
attempted to do so, all three Gingles preconditions
must be met.66 Therefore, courts have fallen into one of three
categories in deciding aggregated minority vote dilution suits.
Either, (1) expressly accepting a minority’s right to aggregate;
(2) implicitly accepting the right to aggregate by applying the
Gingles factors to aggregated minorities, without addressing
directly if a right to aggregate exists; or (3) expressly rejecting
the right to aggregate.67
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Geraci, supra note 25, at 395–97.
Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1241 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1242.
Id.
Id. at 1244, 1246.
Id. at 1244.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
Campos, 840 F.2d at 1244.
Id. at 1244–47.
Id. at 1245.

04/16/2012 17:10:32

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 177 Side B

cases.68 In 1988, the Fifth Circuit expressly validated the
practice of minority aggregation in Campos v. City of
Baytown.69 The plaintiffs, an aggregated group of African
American and Hispanic American voters, filed a section 2
vote dilution suit challenging the City of Baytown’s atlarge election method.70 The District Court for the Southern
District of Texas ruled in favor of the aggregated minority.71
On appeal, the City of Baytown challenged the district court’s
decision, arguing that the claim did not sufficiently meet all
three of the Gingles factors.72 By affirming the decision of the
district court, the Fifth Circuit expressly accepted the
practice of aggregating minorities for section 2 claims but also
suggested a standard for handling aggregated claims by
applying the Gingles analysis.73
First, by finding that the African American and Hispanic
American populations constituted a “sufficiently large and
geographically compact”74 group to comprise a majority in a
single-member district, the Fifth Circuit strictly construed
the Gingles standard and stated that the existence of
minority group members outside the potential minority
district does not affect the groups’ ability to meet the first
requirement.75
As to the second Gingles requirement, the City of
Baytown posed two challenges: whether the plaintiffs focused
on the correct elections to demonstrate cohesion and whether
the evidence itself demonstrated cohesion.76 In response to
the first challenge, that the plaintiffs did not study a
sufficient number of elections nor the correct elections, the
Fifth Circuit echoed the Supreme Court’s determination that
the number of and which elections the plaintiff must study
varies by case.77 More specifically, the Fifth Circuit accepted
the Supreme Court’s suggestion that “the number of elections
in which the minority group has sponsored candidates”
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constitutes an important circumstance.78 By applying both
Supreme Court suggestions, the Fifth Circuit determined that
the plaintiffs correctly assessed only the races in which either
minority group had a member running.79 As to the greater
challenge of demonstrating cohesion, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the finding of cohesion based upon the plaintiff’s
statistical evidence produced at trial.80 In response to the
City of Baytown’s assertion that insufficient evidence existed
to support a finding of racially polarized voting, the Fifth
Circuit held that “Gingles does not require total white bloc
voting” but simply the existence of enough white bloc votes to
“usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”81 Finally,
during its application of the Senate Report Factors, to
complete the totality of the circumstances analysis, the
Fifth Circuit specifically noted the importance of the
minority groups’ shared history of discrimination.82 Through
the Campos holding, the Fifth Circuit expressly accepted the
practice of aggregating racial minorities to bring a section 2
claim, by simply meeting the Gingles requirements.83
The Fifth Circuit furthered its acceptance of minority
vote aggregation in League of United Latin American Citizens
v. Clements (LULAC I).84 The challenge in LULAC I also

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 178 Side A
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78. Id. The Gingles court stated that:
[I]n a district where elections are shown usually to be polarized, the
fact that racially polarized voting is not present in one or a few
individual elections does not necessarily negate the conclusion that the
district experiences legally significant bloc voting. Furthermore, the
success of a minority candidate in a particular election does not
necessarily prove that the district did not experience polarized voting
in that election; special circumstances, such as the absence of an
opponent, incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may explain
minority electoral success in a polarized contest.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57.
79. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245.
80. In Campos, the City of Baytown attempted to argue for the inclusion of
Precinct 248 in the cohesion correlation calculation. Id. at 1247. However, the
majority explicitly affirmed the lower court’s refusal to include this particular
district, despite the fact that Precinct 248 “is overwhelmingly Black” because
the evidence indicated individual political control by a single individual, and
lack of overall Black representativeness since it contained “less than 13% of the
Black population.” Id. at 1247–48.
81. Id. at 1249 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements,
999 F.2d 831, 864 (5th Cir. 1993).
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85. Geraci, supra note 25, at 396.
86. Clements, 999 F.2d at 864.
87. See id.
88. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987).
89. See Geraci, supra note 25, at 397.
90. Id.
91. Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990).
92. Id. at 525.
93. Id. at 526.
94. Id.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 178 Side B

involved the aggregation of African Americans and Hispanic
Americans, and alleged that an at-large voting system
functioned to dilute the votes of racial minorities in school
board elections.85 While the Fifth Circuit ultimately denied
the claim, the majority opinion reaffirmed the court’s express
acceptance of minority aggregation by stating that the Fifth
Circuit has “allow[ed] [the] aggregation of different minority
groups where the evidence suggests that they are
politically cohesive.”86 This express affirmation indicates the
continuation of the Fifth Circuit’s stance on aggregation for
the purposes of filing a section 2 claim.87 Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit continued this trend by acknowledging the vote
dilution claim of African Americans and Hispanic Americans
in Latin American Citizens v. Midland Independent School
District.88 Therefore, while the Fifth Circuit did not find vote
dilution in every case, it did allow the minority groups to
assert the claim in every case, and held them to the same
standard that applies to single minorities’ section 2 claims.89
The Eleventh Circuit also expressly accepted vote
dilution claims filed by aggregated minorities.90 In Concerned
Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee County Board of
Commissioners,91 the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal of an
aggregated minority group consisting of African American
and Hispanic American residents challenging the multimember voting system used to elect the Hardee County
School Board. 92 The Eleventh Circuit expressly held that
“[t]wo minority groups . . . may be a single Section 2 minority
if they can establish that they behave in a politically cohesive
manner.”93 In making this express determination that
minority groups can aggregate, the opinion cited all of the
Fifth Circuit cases, but provided no further justification.94
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately determined that the
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aggregated minorities did not have sufficient evidence of
cohesion to prove their claim, and that the proposed
“functional majority” approach to satisfying the first
Gingles requirement was unpersuasive.95 However, the most
important aspect of the holding was the court’s overall
agreement with the Fifth Circuit regarding its global stance
on minority aggregation.96
2. Implicit Acceptance of Minority Aggregation

04/16/2012 17:10:32

95. The plaintiffs in Hardee attempted to satisfy the first Gingles
requirement by arguing that the African American group, which numerically
comprised only 36% of the population, represented a “functional majority”
because, at that number, given the “average white cross-over vote,” they could
elect a “candidate of their choice.” Id. at 527. However, while the Eleventh
Circuit did not expressly invalidate this theory, they found its application here
unpersuasive. Id.
96. See Geraci, supra note 25, at 397.
97. Id.
98. Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989), abrogated by
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990).
99. Id. at 1420–21.
100. Id. at 1425, 1426–27.
101. Id. at 1427.
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Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has distinctly avoided
making a determination as to whether minorities have the
right to aggregate for the purposes of bringing a section 2 vote
dilution claim under the VRA, thereby falling into the second
category.97 In the Ninth Circuit’s first examination of this
issue, Romero v. City of Pomona,98 an aggregated group of
African American and Hispanic American voters jointly
appealed the District Court for the Central District of
California’s involuntary dismissal of the group’s section 2
claim challenging the city’s at-large voting system. 99 The
Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ appeal to re-open the case
based upon the minority groups’ inability to prove that the
percent of the minority population eligible to vote could
constitute a majority in a single-member district, and that the
two minorities formed a politically cohesive voting group.100
However, the Ninth Circuit did not dismiss the claim based
on the minorities’ attempt to aggregate, but instead dismissed
due to their inability to meet the Gingles requirements.101 By
applying the Gingles test to the case, rather than simply
dismissing it outright, the Ninth Circuit implicitly suggested
that it accepted a minority’s right to aggregate to bring a
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claim under section 2.102
The Ninth Circuit continued to avoid expressing a direct
decision pertaining to minority aggregation in Badillo v.
City of Stockton.103 The Ninth Circuit determined that the
aggregated minority group, comprised of African Americans
and Hispanic Americans, did not meet their burden of proof
regarding a section 2 vote dilution claim.104 Yet, the court
once again applied the Gingles factors to the aggregated minority group.105 By continually applying the Gingles
factors, rather than dispensing with the appeal altogether,
the Ninth Circuit repeatedly and implicitly indicated its
acceptance of aggregated minority groups for section 2
purposes.106
3. Express Rejection of Minority Aggregation

Geraci, supra note 25, at 398.
Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 886.
Id. at 890.
Geraci, supra note 25, at 398.
Latino Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Bos., 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir.
Id. at 409–10.
Id. at 410–11.
See Schulte, supra note 30, at 452.
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102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
1986).
108.
109.
110.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 179 Side B

While all of the cases discussed thus far have either
expressly or implicitly accepted minority aggregation for
section 2 vote dilution claims, several circuit courts have
implicitly or expressly rejected these cases.
In Latino
Political Action Committee, Inc. v. City of Boston107 (L.P.A.C.),
the plaintiffs—an aggregated group of African American,
Asian American, and Hispanic American voters—appealed
the decision of the District Court of Massachusetts.108 The
groups jointly and separately alleged that the district
configuration unnecessarily packed the minorities into three
districts for City Council and School Committee elections,
thereby violating section 2.109 In making its determination,
the First Circuit only briefly mentioned that members from
three minority groups joined in the challenge, and then
proceeded to analyze the aggregated groups’ claims
separately.110 By completely avoiding the combined claim, the
First Circuit implicitly prohibited the aggregation of
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111. See id.
112. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
113. Id. at 1384.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1386–87.
116. Id. at 1387–91.
117. The Sixth Circuit supported its decision denying aggregation by
highlighting the lack of ambiguity in the Voting Rights Act, and the complete
lack of legislative history supporting the right to aggregate. Id. at 1387.
118. In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that section 2 should be applied
with the “broadest possible scope,” the Sixth Circuit such distinguished cases by
highlighting an express Congressional acceptance of the practice in each case.
Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1389 (6th Cir. 1996).
119. Id. at 1390. The Sixth Circuit also highlighted the distinction between a
minority group identified by section 2 and a coalition. Id. at 1390–91
(determining that a “specific finding of discrimination” functioned as the
distinguishing factor).
120. Id. at 1388.
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minorities for section 2 vote dilution claims. 111 However,
L.P.A.C. preceded the Fifth Circuit’s cases that expressly
affirmed minorities’ right to aggregate, which could diminish
the application of the decision.
The Sixth Circuit explicitly forbade the practice of
minority aggregation for the purposes of section 2 vote
dilution claims in Nixon v. Kent County.112 An aggregated
minority of African American and Hispanic American voters
appealed their unsuccessful challenge of the district
composition for the election of the Board of County
Commissioners.113 The minority alleged that the defendants
“pack[ed]” the district with “an excessive percentage of
minority voters” and split “the remaining minority voters
among districts dominated by large white majorities.”114 The
majority of the Sixth Circuit concluded, through the
application of principles of statutory construction, that the
statutory language of the VRA barred aggregated claims by
using singular pronouns.115 However, the opinion foreclosed
the possibility of minority aggregation under additional
theories,116 including a lack of legislative history,117 broadened
scope,118 and policy concerns regarding “coalition lawsuits.”119
The opinion directly echoed the minority opinions from
previous circuit court decisions, most notably from the Fifth
Circuit, as discussed below.120 Ultimately, this case stands
apart, not only because it expressly rejected minority
aggregation, but also because it did so despite substantial
case history that either expressly or implicitly suggested that
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minority aggregation is acceptable.121
While the Fifth Circuit emerged as the first circuit court
to accept minority aggregation for section 2 claims, the
decisions were not all unanimous.122 Fifth Circuit justices
critical of minority aggregation support their rejection of the
practice on a variety of grounds, including: a perceived lack of
Congressional approval, an avoidance of proportional
representation, a perceived misuse of the VRA to protect
political interest groups, dilution of individual minority
concerns, and an avoidance of negative policy implications for
minority voters. 123 Judges arguing against Congressional
authorization most frequently utilize statutory interpretation
arguments to demonstrate a lack of Congressional intent.124
In LULAC I, Judge Jones’ concurring opinion argued for
bringing an end to the theory of minority aggregation for vote
dilution claims. 125 Her support for the request stemmed
directly from her assessment of the legislative intent.126 By
highlighting word choices in the singular rather than plural
form, Judge Jones asserted that Congress consciously and
affirmatively excluded the option of minority aggregation for
section 2 vote dilution claims.127 Judge Jones argued that
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121. See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council, No. 4434 v.
Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming the Fifth Circuit’s favorable
stance on minority aggregation, but refusing to grant relief to the plaintiffs
based on a lack of cohesion and evidence of white bloc voting); Concerned
Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524 (11th
Cir. 1990) (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s acceptance of minority aggregation, but
finding that the particular facts of the case failed to meet the standard for
cohesion); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988) (accepting
minority aggregation, and granting the aggregated minority relief under section
2 of the VRA); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v.
Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming the Fifth
Circuit’s overall approval of minority aggregation, but finding that the cohesion
element was not sufficiently met in this case), vacated on other grounds, 829
F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987).
122. E.g., Clements, 999 F.2d at 894–99 (Jones, J., concurring) (opposing the
use of aggregated minorities to file section 2 vote dilution claims); Midland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d at 1504 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (opposing the
Fifth Circuit’s extension of the VRA to cover aggregated minorities for the
purposes of a section 2 vote dilution claim).
123. Clements, 999 F.2d at 894–99 (Jones, J., concurring).
124. Schulte, supra note 30, at 468.
125. Clements, 999 F.2d at 894–95 (Jones, J., concurring).
126. Id.
127. Judge Jones stated in her concurrence that:
The 1982 amendment to Section 2, which codified the “results” test,
likewise offers no textual support for a minority aggregation theory. It
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Congressional approval, as opposed to a lack of Congressional
prohibition, is the key component in a statutory assessment,
thereby providing a basis to declare minority aggregation
statutorily unlawful.128
Judges also challenge minority aggregation based on
concerns that changes to the current analytical structure
could cause the VRA to evolve unintentionally into a vehicle
to enact a proportional representation system.129 Arguments
regarding this theory typically rely on Congressional intent.130
In LULAC I the concurrence by Judge Jones asserted that
Congress purposely avoided creating the VRA in a manner
that enacted a proportional representation system by
specifically including a functional requirement that the
minority group be large enough to “constitute a majority in a
single-member district.”131 Judge Jones’ concurrence suggests
that minority aggregation could allow aggregated minority
groups to easily override the built-in mechanism against
proportional representation, creating an opportunity for the
VRA to evolve unintentionally into a proportional
representation statute.132
Critics of minority aggregation address their concern
regarding the VRA evolving into a means to support political
interest
groups
by
employing
statutory
language
arguments.133 In her concurrence in LULAC I, Judge Jones
argued that the significance of listing each minority
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 181 Side A
04/16/2012 17:10:32

speaks only of a “class of citizens” and “a protected class.” Had
Congress chosen explicitly to protect minority coalitions it could have
done so by defining the “results” test in terms of protected classes of
citizens. It did not.
Id. at 894 (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988)).
128. Judge Jones stated in her concurrence that:
One may be uncertain what Congress might think about permitting
minority coalitions to assert vote dilution claims, but Congress clearly
walked a fine line in amending Section 2 to codify the results test for
vote dilution claims while expressly prohibiting proportional
representation for minority groups. The results test of vote dilution
inherently recognizes that a minority group will sometimes fail to merit
a single-member district solely because they lack the population to
“constitute a majority in a single-member district.”
Id. at 895 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50, 50 n.17 (1986)).
129. Schulte, supra note 30, at 470.
130. Id. at 455.
131. Clements, 999 F.2d at 895 (Jones, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 895–97.
133. Id. at 894.
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134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See Schulte, supra note 30, at 455–56.
137. See Clements, 999 F.2d at 894 (Jones, J., concurring).
138. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494, 1504 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987).
139. Id.
140. Clements, 999 F.2d at 897–98 (Jones, J., concurring).
141. See Geraci, supra note 25, at 401.
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separately within the statutory language of section 2
warrants separate treatment and protection for different
minorities, thereby distinguishing between racial minorities
and language minorities.134 While Judge Jones acknowledged
that both types of groups enjoy individual protection, she
argued that allowing them to aggregate based on a showing of
cohesion under the Gingles factors simply protects a group
that votes in a politically cohesive manner.135 This line of
argument contends that separate listings correspond to
individual selection based on specific and distinct qualities
shared by the minority.136 Allowing minorities to file a claim,
absent the shared quality, allows the group to gain protection
under section 2 of the VRA based on similar political
ideologies, and does not serve the VRA’s ultimate goals.137
Similarly, in League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Midland Independent School District, Judge Higginbotham’s
dissent suggested that allowing aggregation for section 2
claims could encourage minorities to unite over an issue or
political agenda, unrelated to discriminatory voting
practices. 138 This practice would similarly encourage the
formation of interest groups rather than ensure that minority
votes are equally as powerful as white votes.139
Similarly, judges opposed to minority aggregation argue
that allowing minorities to aggregate for section 2 purposes
could dilute the claims of each individual minority group or
cause racial friction.140 Allowing aggregation could encourage
each minority to strive towards unnatural homogeneity with
another minority group solely for the purposes of filing a
section 2 claim, encouraging false cohesion, and a general
societal assumption of minority homogeneity.141
Ultimately, the majority of courts have allowed
aggregation either by expressly or implicitly accepting the
practice, although the courts appear unlikely to find in favor
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of the aggregated minority without a strong showing of
cohesion.142 However, the arguments presented indicate that
minority aggregation claims have not received consistent
treatment in the federal courts.143 This inconsistency appears
to stem not simply from the disagreement over the validity of
minority aggregation, but also due to the lack of guidance
regarding what an aggregated group must prove for the
purpose of a section 2 claim.144 By eliminating the ambiguity
the entire discussion surrounding minority aggregation could
be resolved.145
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM

Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845.
Schulte, supra note 30, at 454.
See id. at 452.
See id.
Id. at 468–76.
See Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 847–48.
See id. at 845–48.
State and County QuickFacts: USA, supra note 1.
See Ta, supra note 8, at 92–95.
Id. at 110–11.
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142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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Despite the effect of the VRA and other methods meant
to
protect
racial
minorities’
voting
equality,
disenfranchisement issues still exist. Critics of aggregation
take issue with the application of the Gingles test to minority
groups attempting to aggregate for section 2 purposes. 146
Minorities that seek protection under section 2 of the VRA
challenge the effectiveness of the Gingles test by arguing that
a vote dilution claim could still exist even if the Gingles
factors are not satisfied.147 Due to those competing interests,
many scholars view the strict requirements of Gingles as a
bar to the expansion of voting rights jurisprudence. 148
However, the United States is rapidly increasing in the
diversity of its population. 149 Large minority groups that
have recently emigrated or established themselves in the
United States have an increasing interest in protecting the
effectiveness of their vote. 150 Moreover, some argue that
when Congress drafted the VRA, and the Supreme Court
formulated the Gingles requirements, neither Congress nor
the Supreme Court could foresee the future minority diversity
increase in the United States.151 While the language of the
VRA extends to large groups of minorities, the factors
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outlined in Gingles pose inherent limitations upon smaller
racial groups attempting to bring section 2 claims.152 Since
the analysis focuses on the geographic isolation of large
populations, scholars suggest that other factors could more
appropriately assess the dilution of a minority’s vote. 153
Additionally, scholars and racial minorities argue that
the rigidity of this elemental analysis, combined with
the requirements, only has the capacity to protect
disenfranchised African Americans, and therefore requires a
revisitation.154 This commentary creates two issues: the first
is a need for clarity regarding what minorities must prove
under the Gingles test, and the second is the need for a
reexamination of the Gingles test to assess if it accurately
addresses minority vote dilution claims.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Gingles Standard as Applied to Aggregated
Minorities

Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845–48.
Ta, supra note 8, at 110–11.
Id.
Geraci, supra note 25, at 394–95.
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 39–40 (1993).
Id. at 41.
Id.
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152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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While neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
expressly adopted minority aggregation, its general
treatment, as discussed previously, suggests general
viability.155 The next logical question is what standards apply
to a section 2 claim brought by aggregated minorities? The
Supreme Court partially addressed this issue in Growe v.
Emison, stating that “to establish a vote-dilution claim . . . a
plaintiff must prove three threshold conditions.”156 However,
the opinion did not merely stop at the Gingles requirements,
but subtly suggested that minorities may have to meet the
requirements at a higher level.157 By discussing the “higherthan-usual need for the second of the Gingles showings,” the
Supreme Court suggested a heightened standard with regard
to the cohesion of aggregated groups.158 Further, the opinion
makes reference to statistical evidence to prove the second
and third Gingles factors pertaining to cohesion and majority
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bloc voting.159 These suggestions appear to require more from
minorities seeking to aggregate, than from single minorities
without articulating specifically defined boundaries in nonGingles terms. However, two scholarly perspectives have
developed. The first perspective offered by critics of minority
aggregation supports a higher standard for cohesion in
aggregated minorities for section 2 claims.160 Conversely, the
second perspective argues for a new set of requirements that
takes into account the ethnic diversity of the United States,
and draws support from the fact that smaller minority groups
normally cannot meet the size requirements to singularly
assert a section 2 claim. 161 This perspective argues that
a lower threshold could ensure broader coverage
and potentially eliminate the need to aggregate. 162 Both
perspectives acknowledge the concerns surrounding
aggregation, but reach conflicting solutions.
B. Proffered Improvements and Alternative Systems

Id.
See generally Strange, supra note 38, at 113.
See generally Ta, supra note 8, at 90–91.
See id. at 101.
See Schulte, supra note 30, at 457–59.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 457.
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159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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In contrast to the suggestions posed by various minority
groups seeking changes to the Gingles framework, several
scholars support retention of at least some semblance of the
Gingles analysis but would require stronger showings for
aggregated minorities. Specifically, the scholars suggest
more stringent tests regarding the cohesion of the aggregated
groups.163 All of the tests primarily draw upon the arguments
made by Judges Higginbotham and Jones of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in his Midland Independent School District
dissent and her LULAC I concurrence, respectively.164 Two of
them are discussed below.
The test proffered by the Honorable Rick G. Strange of
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that courts
should apply a threshold determination to aggregated
groups before completing a Gingles analysis. 165 Strange’s
test examines “whether the members of the aggregated
groups have similar socio-economic backgrounds,” “whether
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[they] have similar attitudes toward significant issues
affecting the challenged entity,” and “whether [they] have
consistently voted for the same candidates.”166 Particularly,
Strange’s approach accepts aggregation as “theoretically
permissible” if the discrimination has a collective effect on
different minority groups.167 In Strange’s estimation, these
factors more accurately determines if the minorities are
properly aggregated based on similar political causes and
concerns, since aggregated minorities do not share common
ground based on race or national origin, their cohesion
relies solely upon shared values.168 Therefore, requiring this
threshold analysis properly addresses whether their level of
political concern and similarity qualifies as a sufficient
finding of cohesion.169
The Strange approach draws upon several social science
studies, which indicate that America’s racial minority groups
expressly exhibit “political heterogeneity.” 170 Examples of
this racial divergence occur in several states with diverse
minority populations, such as Florida and California.171 This
divergence not only makes it highly unlikely that minorities
can demonstrate the proper level of cohesion in order to
aggregate, but also leads critics to highlight the potential for
inter-minority violence, increased racial hostility and
animosity-based on a correlation between the political success
of a distinct minority group, or groups, and inter-minority
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 183 Side B
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166. Strange, supra note 38, at 129.
167. Id. at 127.
168. See id. at 112, 134–36.
169. See, e.g., id. at 130.
170. The study in the Geraci article refers to a national survey, which tested
attitudes toward specific political parties, policy decisions, and overall country
goals. Geraci, supra note 25, at 401. The results indicated a nineteen-point
difference in the Republican Party’s approval ratings between African
Americans and Asian Americans, and a twenty-nine percent difference in
approval of Ronald Reagan and President Bush’s economic policies between
African Americans and “Southeast-Asians, Indians, and Afghanis.” Id. Finally,
the study indicated that while African Americans viewed “giving people more
say in important political decisions” as the most important national issue, Asian
Americans and Hispanic Americans “felt that maintaining order was
paramount.” Id.
171. In Florida, the Cuban and African American minorities have an intense
rivalry and deep resentment for one another, complete with riot attempts and
economic boycotts of businesses run by the other minority. Id. at 402–03. In
California, racial tensions exist between African American and Hispanic
American minorities. Id. at 403–05. This tension involves police brutality and
a deep-seeded lack of political support between the two minorities. Id.
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See, e.g., id. at 404–05.
Id. at 398–406.
See Strange, supra note 38, at 154.
See id. at 113.
Id.
Id. at 128–29.
Schulte, supra note 30, at 464.
Id. at 458.
Id.
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172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
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conflict.172 Therefore, encouraging aggregation as a remedy
to vote dilution could unintentionally cause general minority
identity dilution, a homogenous societal attitude toward
minorities, and increased minority hostility.173 This model
could eliminate concerns regarding the dilution of individual
minorities’ interests and the support of special-interest
coalitions as opposed to disenfranchised minorities by making
a detailed assessment of the groups’ shared values.174
Additionally, Strange suggests that this approach more
accurately reflects and protects the Congressional intent of
preventing discrimination while preserving the republican
form of government, since there is a fundamental difference
between a minority losing an election for lack of political
support and losing due to racial or ethnic discrimination.175
Such a test also restrains judicial review and involvement in
reapportionment, a traditionally legislative responsibility, by
requiring the minority group to meet a threshold level of
cohesion to file the claim, thereby lessening the number of
judicially created districts. 176 The goals of this approach
attempt to make aggregation work within the current
framework of Gingles by merely adding a threshold test
requiring a heightened showing of cohesion for aggregated
groups to file section 2 claims.177
Another test, known as the “minority-groups-as-one
test,” 178 suggested by Professors Katharine Butler and
Richard Murray, proposes an assessment of “whether the two
groups consider themselves one under circumstances in which
each group can benefit separately,” requiring a finding that
the minority groups are “indeed one” and “shared a
discriminatory treatment at the hands of the majority.”179 By
focusing on the level of cohesion, this standard furthers
Butler and Murray’s view that minorities are not simply
fungible entities and, that by treating them as such, the
true purpose of the VRA is not served.180 Most importantly,
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they believe that minorities are protected based on their
particular experiences with discrimination, and their
defining differences inherently lack cohesion.181 For example,
discrimination against African Americans began with slavery,
while Hispanic discrimination began with cultural and
linguistic differences, and Japanese discrimination began
during World War II.182 Further, Butler and Murray’s test
particularly prizes social science data that is skeptical of true
minority cohesion, and therefore aggregation generally. 183
Ultimately, the proposal seeks to heighten the cohesion
element of the Gingles test, and alter the focus to more
stringently assess the level of cohesion between the
minorities, thereby requiring a heightened standard for
aggregated section 2 claims.
C. Issues Within the Current Thornburg v. Gingles
Framework

04/16/2012 17:10:32

181. Id. at 464.
182. Id. at 458, 464.
183. Id. at 465.
184. Id. at 442.
185. Ta, supra note 8, at 101.
186. Id. at 101, 103–04, 107.
187. The first Gingles prong requires a minority group to demonstrate that it
is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in
single-member district.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986).
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As discussed above, scholars and an increasing number of
minority groups in the United States have identified that
Congress passed the VRA primarily to stop African American
disenfranchisement, and to ensure the group’s equal voting
strength.184 To that end, critics of the Gingles framework,
and minority aggregation in general, agree that the current
system does not adequately protect the Congressional
intent behind the VRA or provide protection for the
diverse minority populations.185 While the primary concerns
of minority aggregation critics were previously discussed,
minorities seeking protection under the VRA raise additional
issues with regard to each individual prong of the Gingles
analysis.186
First, several minority groups challenge both
requirements of the first Gingles prong187 by suggesting that
the Supreme Court intended a less stringent requirement
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188. Ta, supra note 8, at 101.
189. Id.
190. Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 846.
191. Id.
192. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).
193. Ta, supra note 8, at 101–03.
194. Id.
195. “Scholars have repeatedly pointed out that the Supreme Court’s
requirement of ‘geographically compactness’ is not applicable to APIs and
Latinos because both groups live in less compact areas and are more dispersed
than African Americans.” Id. at 103.
196. Id.
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regarding the minority’s population size.188 Primarily, they
suggest that Gingles did not require the ability to comprise a
majority in a single-member district, and that the current
requirement is a fiction created by the lower courts.189 This
fiction creates a barrier preventing minority groups that
represent as much as fifty percent of the population from
filing a section 2 claim.190 In this sense, the Gingles standard
eliminates an entire portion of the minority population from
seeking protection for vote dilution, based simply on a
requirement promulgated by the lower courts.191 Requiring
this minority population showing firmly limits the scope of
the VRA against the specific legislative authorization to
protect these smaller minority groups.192
Critics also challenge the first prong’s requirement of
compactness by arguing that the compactness requirement
merely serves as a strict functional requirement, not
applicable to all minority groups.193 Minority groups utilizing
this line of reasoning suggest that the compactness
requirement reflects how the VRA’s history is deeply rooted
in an African American model of disenfranchisement. 194
While it may have been common for African American
minority groups to live in a concentrated setting at the
adoption of the VRA, social scientists suggest that the living
situations of other minority communities, such as Asians and
Hispanics, do not fit into a compact model, and therefore
would necessarily fail this required Gingles element.195
Next, the second Gingles prong requires political cohesion
amongst the minority groups bringing a section 2 vote
dilution claim. 196 Within the Asian American community
this requirement has garnered criticism based on the
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197. Id. at 103–05.
198. See id. at 105–06.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 106–07.
202. Id. at 102.
203. The third Gingles prong requires a minority group to prove that “the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . to defeat the
minority’s preferred candidate.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
204. Ta, supra note 8, at 107–08.
205. Ta suggests that in a state such as California, which has a minority
majority, the Gingles test can be ineffective in instances where the votes of
combined separate minority groups outnumber those of an opposing white
voting bloc. Id. at 107.
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diversity of Asian groups present in the United States. 197
Asian American groups filing a section 2 claim as a group of
Asian
Americans
may
only
meet
the
cohesiveness requirement for Asian candidates.198 Given the group’s
diversity regarding a variety of factors, such as length of time
they have lived in the United States, age, and cultural
differences, their politics may diverge in the absence of an
Asian American candidate.199 Further, the Asian American
population specifically appears to be in a state of political
transition based on the length of time spent in the United
States and the growing population of young first generation
American-born children. 200 While this argument directly
contrasts with criticism of minority aggregation regarding the
formation of interest groups, it poses a real difficulty for
minority groups that seek and feel that they require
protection under the VRA, but are comprised of multiple
smaller, specific populations.201 Additionally, if the smaller
fractional groups attempted to bring a section 2 claim, they
would have difficulty meeting the first Gingles
requirement.202
Finally, as to the third prong, 203 minorities seeking
protection under the VRA argue that the assessment of a
white voting bloc poses challenges based on the increasing
difficulty of distinguishing such a voting bloc.204 Additionally,
requiring the white voting bloc provides an opportunity for
smaller portions of a fragmented minority group to become
subsumed within the larger umbrella minority category,
allowing for an entirely new form of dilution.205 Further, the
Supreme Court has specifically stated that “[u]nless [the
Gingles preconditions] are established, there neither has been
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Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993).
Id.
Ta, supra note 8, at 101–09.
Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 835–40.
Id. at 830–32.
Id. at 830–31.
Id. at 831–32.
Id. at 832–33.
Id. at 833.
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a wrong nor can be a remedy,” indicating that courts cannot
simply presume white bloc voting. 206 Instead the plaintiffs
must prove it, along with the other preconditions.207 These
concerns regarding the Gingles standard indicate that the
approach creates several issues and barriers regarding the
protection of other minority groups beyond the white
majority/African American minority model, and definitely
amongst groups attempting to aggregate.208
These concerns led scholars with a more favorable
outlook on minority aggregation to focus on different
alterations to the Gingles standard, especially in cases
concerning multi-ethnic communities.209 Professors Angelo N.
Ancheta and Kathryn K. Imahara pose two contrasting
theoretical outlooks on minority aggregation. 210 The first
proposes that minority groups are drawn together and vote
based on discrimination that they have jointly suffered,
suggesting the possibility of successful minority aggregation
for the purposes of section 2 claims.211 However, the second
theory states that the differences inherent in minority
groups, based on their varying history and culture, draws
them apart, making minority aggregation impossible.212 The
resulting divergence of these theories requires a case-by-case
analysis of whether any group of minorities can aggregate
based on the specific factual underpinnings of their section 2
claim.213 Ancheta and Imahara suggest that a case-by-case
analysis of the potential for minority aggregation will be
driven by how large the minority communities are in relation
to the white majority, whether the minority communities
share common problems, and whether the minority
populations share important social and economic concerns.214
In suggesting the potential for aggregation, Ancheta and
Imahara draw upon favorable social science studies finding
evidence of minority cohesion when shared interests are
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involved.215 The scholars suggest that minorities found to be
cohesive—and thus truly able to aggregate—will be small in
comparison to the white majority population, will share
common problems, and will share important social and
economic concerns.216
However, Ancheta and Imahara also acknowledge the
under-inclusive nature of Gingles in multi-ethnic
communities—specifically regarding situations when the
totality of the circumstances indicates vote dilution—by
meeting all of the Senate Report Factors, but failing to satisfy
the functional Gingles requirement for size and dispersion.217
This critique suggests revisiting the Gingles factors to craft a
standard that protects the groups requiring protection under
section 2 of the VRA.218
All of these concerns suggest the need for system-wide
change to create a standard that allows all minorities affected
by vote dilution to bring claims under section 2.219 These
challenges begin to suggest that alteration of the Gingles
standards could eliminate the debate regarding minority
aggregation because each individual minority could file its
own claim in the absence of stringent numerical
requirements.
IV. PROPOSAL

04/16/2012 17:10:32

215. “A number of studies have found that minorities can form coalitions and
support candidates when the issues at stake are of common interest.” Id. at
832.
216. Id. at 833–34.
217. Id. at 839.
218. See id. at 845–47.
219. See id.
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This Comment proposes a solution that attempts to
address minority aggregation in two ways.
First, by
reconstructing the analytical system for the VRA and thereby
decreasing the need for minority aggregation, Congress
grants section 2 the broad reach intended at its inception.
Second, by specifically outlining an analytical approach and
standards for section 2 claims, Congress ensures uniform
treatment to aggregated minorities. This approach begins by
first assessing if the claim of the minority groups pertains to
a community with a high level of multi-ethnic diversity. This
diversity assessment will be based on the population
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percentages of each voting age eligible minority population.
If several groups of minorities each compose a statistically
significant amount of the population, approximately ten
percent or more, then claims of single or aggregated
minorities in that community will be assessed using a
modified Gingles analysis. However, communities with a
single distinctive minority group will continue to be assessed
under the current Gingles standards.
A. Modified Gingles Analysis

Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988).
Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845–46.
Ta, supra note 8, at 103.
California Voting Rights Act, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14028(c) (West 2010).

04/16/2012 17:10:32

220.
221.
222.
223.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 187 Side A

The modified Gingles standard could apply to minority
groups representing less than ten percent of the district’s
total population and will retain the same factors for assessing
section 2 claims, but require a lesser showing of certain
elements. First, by encouraging a less strict requirement
regarding size and compactness, requiring that the groups
only prove that they are reasonably large and geographically
compact.
To meet the modified size and dispersion
requirements the group would only have to prove that it has
the ability to effect the outcome of an election in a
statistically significant way. Currently, the lower courts
interpret the “sufficiently large” and “geographically compact”
Gingles requirement as requiring the minority group to prove
that it could constitute a majority in a single-member
district. 220 However, this standard definitively eliminates
vote dilution claims by minority populations comprising as
much as fifty percent of the population within a district.221
Moreover, studies indicate that not all minority groups live in
the condensed community setting required by Gingles. 222
Precedent for this change exists in voting acts created within
individual states. California’s Voting Rights Act states that
“[t]he fact that members of a protected class are not
geographically compact or concentrated may not preclude a
finding of racially polarized voting, or a violation of Section
14027.”223 Minimizing the burden of meeting this Gingles
requirement and applying the reasonableness showing on a
case-by-case basis, achieves both of the proposals goals, by
allowing smaller minorities to file a section 2 claim alone,
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224. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1236–41 (2009) (affirming the
decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and holding that section 2
relief requires proof that a minority constitutes more than 50% of the district’s
population, as opposed to a mere influence district). The Supreme Court
described influence districts as a district in which “a minority group composes a
numerical working majority of the voting-age population.” Id. at 1236.
225. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245.
226. See id.
227. Strange, supra note 38, at 129.
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lessening the need to aggregate, and simultaneously outlining
the standard of review for an aggregated minority group.
Additionally, while this change appears to contrast with the
Supreme Court’s recent decision regarding an “intermediate
‘crossover’ district” in Bartlett v. Strickland,224 this change
appears to be the most feasible way to cover the effected
minority groups.
Analyzing the cohesion of the minority groups according
to the non-heightened standard outlined by the Campos court
should also be encouraged to promote aggregation amongst
minority groups comprising less than ten percent of their
district’s population. In Campos the majority stated that the
proper standard of minority cohesion under Gingles was
simply “whether the minority group together votes in a
cohesive manner for the minority candidate.”225 In assessing
this standard, the court should focus specifically on elections
involving a minority candidate and look at the statistical
patterns of the entire group regarding support for a candidate
of either minority.226 Successful claims will demonstrate that
the group votes for the minority candidate to an acceptable
level of statistical significance. In making this assessment
the court can take into account the factors, such as those
enumerated by Strange—including whether aggregated
groups have similar socio-economic backgrounds or attitudes
toward overarching community issues—but the court should
primarily base its decision on the statistical evidence. 227
Ultimately, this cohesion analysis supports both of the
proposal’s goals of broad application by lessening the need to
aggregate and outlining specific standards for aggregated
minorities.
Finally, retaining the third Gingles factor ensures that
government intervention only assists groups if their lack of
representation corresponds to discriminatory behavior.
Traditionally, this final Gingles requirement served to protect
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the legislative intent behind the VRA by requiring that the
lack of minority representation correspond to racial
polarization or a discriminatory practice, rather than a
simple lack of political support.228 By continuing to require
an adequate showing of racial polarization and vote dilution
at the forefront of the analysis, this final requirement guards
against concerns expressed by critics of minority
aggregation—regarding proportional representation and the
promotion of political interest groups—allowing the element
to retain its protective function over the VRA’s express
purpose.
CONCLUSION
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228. See Ta, supra note 8, at 107.
229. See supra Introduction.
230. See Ta, supra note 8, at 101.
231. See California Voting Rights Act, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14028(c) (West
2010); Ancheta & Imahara, supra note 10, at 845–47.
232. See Schulte, supra note 30, at 470.
233. Judge Jones’ concurrence suggests that the VRA does not apply to
coalitions because “Congress did not authorize the pursuit of Section 2 vote
dilution claims by coalitions of distinct ethnic and language minorities.” League
of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 894
(5th Cir. 1993) (Jones, J., concurring).
234. See Ta, supra note 8, at 103.
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America’s turbulent history regarding minority groups
makes voting rights issues sensitive and contentious. 229
While the United States expands and develops, the legal
remedies for minority disenfranchisement must evolve to
meet the country’s changing needs.230 Scholarship and state
enactments of voting rights legislation indicates that the
Gingles factors prevent Section 2 of the VRA from adequately
protecting minorities from vote dilution.231 However, drastic
and unwarranted change could inadvertently alter our
republican form of government.232 Congress respected that
foundation when it developed and enacted the VRA to protect
the political interests of America’s minorities.233 However,
the interest in preserving the foundation elements of the VRA
and the U.S. voting system in general do not completely bar
evolution of the requirements to bring a section 2 challenge.
Historically, the VRA formed around the African American
minority and was based upon the traditional patterns
representative of that minority group.234 Current minority
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populations diverge from that model in both subtle and
drastic ways. 235 Therefore, an updated test with broader
coverage, accounting for the competing interests of minority
groups and incorporating standards that acknowledge the
different characteristics of the growing minority populations
in the United States, is necessary to acknowledge and protect
the increasingly diverse population. However, structuring
the test to protect the form of representation present in the
United States, could solve the contentious aggregation
discussion while protecting the diverse ethnic communities.
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